VOL. XCIV, NO. 247

★ WIDE MOAT STOCKS & COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES ★

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Wednesday, December 31, 2025

Union Pacific Corporation

UNP · New York Stock Exchange

Market cap (USD)
SectorIndustrials
CountryUS
Data as of
Moat score
72/ 100

Weighted average of segment moat scores, combining moat strength, durability, confidence, market structure, pricing power, and market share.

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Overview

Union Pacific is a U.S. Class I railroad whose core franchise is its owned or controlled right-of-way network across the western two-thirds of the United States, connecting major ports and cross-border gateways. The moat is primarily structural: a dense, long-lived physical network and rights-of-way that are extremely difficult to replicate, reinforced by scale economics in a high fixed-cost industry. Commercial performance depends on sustained service reliability and productivity, and pricing is constrained by competition from trucking, barges, and pipelines and by regulation (STB) on certain traffic. Segment economics vary: bulk and industrial tend to be steadier with lane-specific advantages, while premium (intermodal) is more price-competitive versus trucking.

Primary segment

Industrial

Market structure

Oligopoly

Market share

HHI:

Coverage

4 segments · 5 tags

Updated 2025-12-30

Segments

Bulk

Rail freight transportation for bulk commodities (grain, fertilizer, food/refrigerated, coal and renewables)

Revenue

29.7%

Structure

Oligopoly

Pricing

moderate

Share

Peers

BRK.BCNICPCSX+1

Industrial

Rail freight transportation for industrial commodities (chemicals and plastics, metals and minerals, forest products, energy and specialized markets)

Revenue

34.8%

Structure

Oligopoly

Pricing

moderate

Share

Peers

BRK.BCNICPCSX+1

Premium

Rail freight transportation for premium traffic (intermodal and automotive)

Revenue

29.5%

Structure

Oligopoly

Pricing

weak

Share

Peers

BRK.BCNICPCSX+1

Other subsidiary, accessorial and other revenues

Ancillary rail-related services (accessorial charges, logistics and other subsidiary operations)

Revenue

5.9%

Structure

Competitive

Pricing

moderate

Share

Peers

CHRWJBHT

Moat Claims

Bulk

Rail freight transportation for bulk commodities (grain, fertilizer, food/refrigerated, coal and renewables)

Revenue_share computed from FY2024: Bulk freight revenues $7.207B (32% of freight) and total operating revenues $24.250B.

Oligopoly

Permits Rights Of Way

Legal

Strength: 5/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 2 evidence

Private rail right-of-way and track ownership plus the need to build and maintain the network create very high barriers to entry versus alternative transport modes that rely on public rights-of-way.

Erosion risks

  • Expanded economic regulation (rates, reciprocal switching, service mandates)
  • Service degradation that triggers regulatory and political backlash
  • Lane competition from barges or trucks on key corridors

Leading indicators

  • STB rulemaking and enforcement outcomes (reciprocal switching, rate cases, service orders)
  • Route-mile or terminal divestitures and abandonments
  • On-time performance and service metrics vs commitments

Counterarguments

  • In many lanes, bulk shippers can substitute barges or trucks, limiting pricing freedom
  • Regulators can constrain returns for traffic deemed captive or rate-unreasonable

Physical Network Density

Supply

Strength: 4/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 2 evidence

A large, connected network with port and cross-border corridors increases coverage and operating leverage, and supports high asset utilization across bulk flows.

Erosion risks

  • Disintermediation via new pipelines or ports or shifts in commodity flow patterns
  • Natural disasters and extreme weather damaging critical corridors
  • Underinvestment reducing network reliability and velocity

Leading indicators

  • Capital spend on infrastructure renewal and capacity projects
  • Freight car velocity and terminal dwell trends
  • Network fluidity during peak demand and weather events

Counterarguments

  • BNSF and other Class I carriers have comparable network scale in key corridors
  • Network advantages can be neutralized if service reliability lags peers

Scale Economies Unit Cost

Supply

Strength: 4/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 2 evidence

Railroads have high fixed infrastructure and maintenance costs; higher density and volume over a large network can lower unit costs, but peers also enjoy significant scale.

Erosion risks

  • Structural volume declines in key bulk categories (e.g., coal) raising unit costs
  • Persistent service problems forcing higher staffing and equipment buffers
  • Input cost inflation (labor, fuel, materials) outpacing pricing

Leading indicators

  • Operating ratio and cost per gross ton-mile (where disclosed)
  • Volume density trends by corridor and commodity
  • Capital intensity trends vs asset condition and service

Counterarguments

  • Most Class I railroads are already at scale; unit-cost advantages may be modest
  • Low utilization periods can quickly dilute scale benefits

Operational Excellence

Supply

Strength: 3/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 2 evidence

Documented productivity gains and improved service metrics can compound into better asset turns and customer retention, but sustained execution is required.

Erosion risks

  • Labor availability and attrition reducing reliability and productivity
  • Congestion events reducing velocity and asset turns
  • Safety incidents increasing costs and scrutiny

Leading indicators

  • Freight car velocity, terminal dwell, and SPI (service performance index)
  • Operating ratio trend through cycles
  • Customer service complaints and contract performance

Counterarguments

  • Operational excellence is imitable and can reverse with leadership or labor shocks
  • Superior service does not always translate to pricing power in competitive bulk lanes

Industrial

Rail freight transportation for industrial commodities (chemicals and plastics, metals and minerals, forest products, energy and specialized markets)

Revenue_share computed from FY2024: Industrial freight revenues $8.440B (37% of freight) and total operating revenues $24.250B.

Oligopoly

Permits Rights Of Way

Legal

Strength: 5/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 2 evidence

Industrial rail flows depend on controlled rights-of-way and regulated railroad operations; replicating the physical and regulatory footprint is prohibitively difficult.

Erosion risks

  • Regulatory changes (reciprocal switching, exemptions, rate complaint procedures)
  • Community opposition and permitting friction for expansions and yard operations
  • Service disruptions reducing shipper confidence

Leading indicators

  • STB actions impacting switching and rate frameworks
  • Industrial service reliability metrics and hazardous-material incident trends
  • Capex allocated to capacity and resilience projects

Counterarguments

  • Where served by multiple carriers or interchanges, shippers can create routing alternatives
  • Pipelines and trucking can substitute for some energy and chemical flows on certain routes

Physical Network Density

Supply

Strength: 4/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 2 evidence

A dense set of yards, terminals, and corridors supports broad industrial origin and destination coverage and interchanges across North America.

Erosion risks

  • Network bottlenecks on key industrial corridors
  • Extreme weather disrupting industrial hubs
  • Disintermediation via reshoring or relocation changing flows

Leading indicators

  • Industrial carload volumes vs industrial production indexes
  • Terminal dwell and congestion metrics at major yards
  • Customer complaints and STB service complaint database activity

Counterarguments

  • Industrial traffic can be routed through competing carriers where geography allows
  • Trucking can win on speed or short-haul and for time-sensitive shipments

Scale Economies Unit Cost

Supply

Strength: 4/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 1 evidence

Large fixed costs in infrastructure, rolling stock, and maintenance benefit from high density and scale; however, similar scale exists among Class I peers.

Erosion risks

  • Volume shocks (industrial recession) reducing density and raising unit costs
  • Input cost inflation (labor and materials) outpacing productivity
  • Overbuilding capacity that is not utilized

Leading indicators

  • Cost per unit moved and operating ratio
  • Locomotive and workforce productivity metrics
  • Capex efficiency and asset condition indicators

Counterarguments

  • Scale does not guarantee superior cost if operations are congested or inefficient
  • Industrial shippers may multi-home across transport modes where feasible

Operational Excellence

Supply

Strength: 3/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 1 evidence

Documented improvements in productivity and service metrics can improve industrial shipper outcomes and reduce unit costs, but performance must be sustained through cycles.

Erosion risks

  • Labor disruptions and crew shortages
  • Safety incidents causing network slowdowns and cost spikes
  • Technology outages or cyber incidents

Leading indicators

  • Manifest SPI and velocity and dwell
  • Safety performance (derailments, injuries)
  • IT and dispatching resilience incidents

Counterarguments

  • Operational excellence is not exclusive; competitors can match performance
  • Some industrial customers prioritize lowest delivered cost and may switch modes

Premium

Rail freight transportation for premium traffic (intermodal and automotive)

Revenue_share computed from FY2024: Premium freight revenues $7.164B (31% of freight), comprised of Automotive $2.452B and Intermodal $4.712B; total operating revenues $24.250B.

Oligopoly

Permits Rights Of Way

Legal

Strength: 5/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 1 evidence

Premium rail corridors and terminals depend on right-of-way control and long-lived infrastructure that is difficult to replicate; intermodal and auto networks are built around these corridors.

Erosion risks

  • Regulatory changes that increase switching or reduce exclusivity of certain routes
  • Terminal congestion reducing service levels
  • Shifts in trade flows away from served ports and corridors

Leading indicators

  • Intermodal dwell and turn times and on-time performance
  • STB policy changes affecting service and competition
  • Port volume trends and container flows through served corridors

Counterarguments

  • Intermodal is often highly contestable vs trucking, weakening corridor pricing
  • Large shippers and IMCs can reroute volumes among carriers and modes

Physical Network Density

Supply

Strength: 4/5 · Durability: durable · Confidence: 5/5 · 2 evidence

A network of inland intermodal terminals and automotive distribution centers increases practical coverage and service options for premium traffic.

Erosion risks

  • Trucking competitiveness improvements (autonomous or fuel efficiency) in intermodal lanes
  • Port disruptions and labor issues changing routing patterns
  • Auto production regional shifts reducing served flows

Leading indicators

  • Intermodal volumes vs truckload capacity and spot rates
  • Automotive unit shipments and plant utilization in served regions
  • Terminal throughput and average gate turn times

Counterarguments

  • Competitor railroads can have comparable intermodal terminal networks
  • Shippers can multi-home: rail for long-haul, truck for time-sensitive segments

Scale Economies Unit Cost

Supply

Strength: 3/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 1 evidence

Premium traffic benefits from scale and network density, but intermodal pricing is often set in a competitive environment vs trucking and is sensitive to mix and service quality.

Erosion risks

  • Truck rate declines compressing intermodal margins
  • Service disruptions that cause share loss to trucking
  • Equipment availability constraints (containers, chassis, railcars)

Leading indicators

  • Intermodal average revenue per car and yield trends
  • Truck spot rates and capacity utilization
  • Service performance vs competitors (velocity, on-time)

Counterarguments

  • Intermodal customers can shift volumes quickly between rail and truck
  • Competitors can match costs through their own scale and network density

Operational Excellence

Supply

Strength: 3/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 4/5 · 1 evidence

Service reliability and terminal execution are critical in premium markets; management cites improvements in service metrics and volume handling capacity.

Erosion risks

  • Network and terminal congestion in peak seasons
  • Labor constraints affecting service reliability
  • Cyber and IT outages disrupting dispatching or terminal operations

Leading indicators

  • Intermodal SPI and network velocity
  • Peak season congestion metrics
  • Customer retention among large IMCs and logistics providers

Counterarguments

  • Operational performance can revert; it is not a structural moat by itself
  • In intermodal, price and service competition with trucking is persistent

Other subsidiary, accessorial and other revenues

Ancillary rail-related services (accessorial charges, logistics and other subsidiary operations)

Revenue_share computed from FY2024: Other subsidiary revenues $0.788B + Accessorial $0.554B + Other $0.097B = $1.439B of total operating revenues $24.250B.

Competitive

Scope Economies

Supply

Strength: 2/5 · Durability: medium · Confidence: 3/5 · 1 evidence

Ancillary revenues can be supported by bundling rail transportation with accessorial services and related logistics offerings, leveraging the underlying rail franchise.

Erosion risks

  • Logistics services are typically competitive and lower-moat
  • Disintermediation by digital freight platforms
  • Margin compression if treated as a commodity service

Leading indicators

  • Other subsidiary revenues trend vs freight cycles
  • Gross margin contribution of non-freight activities (if disclosed)
  • Customer retention in logistics offerings

Counterarguments

  • Most logistics and ancillary services have low switching costs and many alternatives
  • Ancillary revenues can be volatile and dependent on rail volumes

Evidence

sec_filing
Union Pacific Corporation Form 10-K (FY ended 2024-12-31) - Risk Factors (Competition)

Additionally, we must build or acquire and maintain our rail system, while trucks, barges, and maritime operators are able to use public rights-of-way maintained by public entities.

Directly supports the right-of-way and capex barrier as a moat mechanism.

sec_filing
Union Pacific Corporation Form 10-K (FY ended 2024-12-31) - Properties (Track)

Our rail network includes 32,880 route miles. We own 26,291 miles and operate on the remainder pursuant to trackage rights or leases.

Shows the scale and ownership or control of rail infrastructure and rights-of-way.

sec_filing
Union Pacific Corporation Form 10-K (FY ended 2024-12-31) - Operations (Network description)

We have 32,880 route miles, connecting Pacific Coast and Gulf Coast ports with the Midwest and Eastern U.S. gateways ... corridors to key Mexican and Canadian gateways.

Direct evidence of a large, strategically connected freight rail network.

sec_filing
Union Pacific Corporation Form 10-K (FY ended 2024-12-31) - Properties (Facilities)

In addition to our track structure, we operate numerous facilities, including terminals for intermodal and other freight; rail yards ... dispatching centers ... shops ....

Network density is not just track miles; it includes yards, terminals, dispatching, and maintenance infrastructure.

sec_filing
Union Pacific Corporation Form 10-K (FY ended 2024-12-31) - Significant Accounting Policies (Repairs and maintenance)

Total expense for repairs and maintenance incurred was approximately $2.3 billion for 2024 ...

Illustrates the fixed and recurring cost base that benefits from scale and high utilization.

Showing 5 of 20 sources.

Risks & Indicators

Erosion risks

  • Expanded economic regulation (rates, reciprocal switching, service mandates)
  • Service degradation that triggers regulatory and political backlash
  • Lane competition from barges or trucks on key corridors
  • Disintermediation via new pipelines or ports or shifts in commodity flow patterns
  • Natural disasters and extreme weather damaging critical corridors
  • Underinvestment reducing network reliability and velocity

Leading indicators

  • STB rulemaking and enforcement outcomes (reciprocal switching, rate cases, service orders)
  • Route-mile or terminal divestitures and abandonments
  • On-time performance and service metrics vs commitments
  • Capital spend on infrastructure renewal and capacity projects
  • Freight car velocity and terminal dwell trends
  • Network fluidity during peak demand and weather events
Created 2025-12-30
Updated 2025-12-30

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