The Boeing Company BA
NYSEAerospace and defenseFinancials to Jun 30, 2026 · Updated Oct 3, 2026
Moat ranks
Balance sheet
| $B | Dec 31 | Jun 30 |
|---|---|---|
| Cash | 10.9 | 7.2 |
| Securities | 18.5 | 12.8 |
| Debt | 54.1 | 45.9 |
| Net cash | -24.7 | -25.9 |
| Equity | 5.5 | 6.1 |
- Debt / EBITDA
- 6.75×
- Debt / equity
- 7.52×
- Leases (12/31/25)
- $2.5B
- Diluted shares
- 791M
- Book value / share
- $7.72
- Price / book
- 25.1×
- Net cash / share
- −$32.73
- Market cap
- $153.0B
- Enterprise value
- $178.9B
Per-share record
Key indicators
| Indicator | Latest | Vs year ago | Last 8 quarters |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue growth | 8.0% | -26.9 pts | |
| Operating margin | 0.6% | +1.4 pts | |
| FCF margin | 2.6% | +3.4 pts | |
| Capex / revenue | 3.0% | +1.1 pts | |
| Commercial airplane deliveries | 171 | +14% | |
| 737 program deliveries | 129 | +24% | |
| 787 program deliveries | 25 | +4% | |
| Commercial Airplanes operating profit | −$322M | +42% | |
| Commercial Airplanes backlog | $596.7B | +14% |
Margins and growth from reported quarters; company KPIs as reported in results releases.
About BA
Boeing sells commercial jets, military aircraft and space systems, then supports aircraft over their service lives. Commercial Airplanes is the largest segment, with 44.8% of H1 2026 segment revenue.
- Capex Knowhow Scale
Designing, certifying and producing large jets requires engineering experience, major factories and a qualified supplier base built over decades.
- Design In Qualification
An airline that stays within an aircraft family can reuse trained crews, spares, maintenance procedures and ground equipment.
- Government Contracting Relationships
Security requirements, prior program experience and systems-integration capability limit the pool of credible defense bidders.
- Long Term Contracts
Multi-year aircraft and space contracts give Boeing a place on programs that are hard to transfer during development and production.
- Dec 31, 2025 · Gain +$9.6B
Selling the digital aviation businesses raised reported operating earnings. The gain does not recur, and the sold businesses no longer contribute revenue or profit.
- Jun 30, 2025 · Legal charge −$445M
The MAX agreement required additional compensation for crash victims' families, adding a legal charge to operating earnings.
- Dec 31, 2024 · Severance charge −$295M
The workforce-reduction program caused a severance charge as Boeing cut staffing during its recovery.
- Jun 30, 2024 · Legal charge −$244M
Boeing accrued a Justice Department fine related to the MAX criminal case; the fine was separate from normal aircraft production costs.
- Jun 30, 2024 · Tax benefit +$490M
Settlement of the 2018-2020 federal tax audit reduced tax expense. The separate $155 million valuation-allowance expense remains in reported earnings.
Ownership
Go deeper on BA
- Compare stock research toolsFundamentals, valuation and screening platforms for BA.19 tools
- See BA's price chartNo price chart here yet. See price history and indicators.17 tools
- Read BA's earnings callsTranscripts and audio of results calls, with management's own words.15 tools
- Investing tool dealsCurrent discounts on research, charting and tracking tools.81 deals
On this page
Financial record
| Fiscal year | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 | TTM | Trend | Change 2016–25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Per share ($) | |||||||||||||
| Revenue | 145.45 | 154.11 | 172.72 | 135.41 | 102.28 | 106.00 | 111.97 | 128.42 | 102.82 | 117.36 | 118.89 | -2.4%/yr | |
| Cash flow | 16.33 | 21.88 | 26.17 | -4.33 | -32.38 | -5.81 | 5.90 | 9.84 | -18.67 | 1.40 | 4.60 | -23.9%/yr | |
| Earnings | 7.83 | 13.87 | 17.87 | -1.12 | -20.88 | -7.15 | -8.30 | -3.67 | -18.27 | 2.93 | 3.08 | -10.3%/yr | |
| Free cash flow | 12.26 | 19.03 | 23.23 | -7.57 | -34.67 | -7.48 | 3.85 | 7.32 | -22.12 | -2.46 | -0.27 | – | |
| Capex | 4.07 | 2.85 | 2.94 | 3.24 | 2.29 | 1.67 | 2.05 | 2.52 | 3.45 | 3.86 | 4.87 | -0.6%/yr | |
| Dividends | 4.29 | 5.60 | 6.74 | 8.19 | 2.04 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.43 | 0.44 | -22.5%/yr | |
| Book value | 1.27 | 2.71 | 0.58 | -15.24 | -32.21 | -25.53 | -26.70 | -28.45 | -6.04 | 7.15 | 7.72 | +21.2%/yr | |
| Diluted shares (M) | 643 | 610 | 586 | 565 | 569 | 588 | 595 | 606 | 647 | 762 | 791 | +1.9%/yr | |
| Totals ($B) | |||||||||||||
| Revenue | 93.5 | 94.0 | 101.1 | 76.6 | 58.2 | 62.3 | 66.6 | 77.8 | 66.5 | 89.5 | 94.0 | -0.5%/yr | |
| Operating income | 6.5 | 10.3 | 12.0 | -2.0 | -12.8 | -2.9 | -3.5 | -0.8 | -10.7 | 4.3 | 4.6 | -4.6%/yr | |
| Net income | 5.0 | 8.5 | 10.5 | -0.6 | -11.9 | -4.2 | -4.9 | -2.2 | -11.8 | 2.2 | 2.4 | -8.6%/yr | |
| Free cash flow | 7.9 | 11.6 | 13.6 | -4.3 | -19.7 | -4.4 | 2.3 | 4.4 | -14.3 | -1.9 | -0.2 | – | |
| Buybacks | 7.0 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 2.7 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | – | |
| Dividends | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.9 | 4.6 | 1.2 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | -21.0%/yr | |
| Net cash | 0.1 | -1.1 | -5.3 | -17.3 | -38.0 | -41.9 | -39.8 | -36.3 | -27.6 | -24.7 | -25.9 | −$24.8B | |
| Margins & returns (%) | |||||||||||||
| Gross margin | 15.5 | 18.5 | 19.4 | 5.8 | -9.8 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 9.9 | -3.0 | 4.8 | 4.7 | -10.7 pts | |
| Operating margin | 7.0 | 11.0 | 11.9 | -2.6 | -22.0 | -4.6 | -5.3 | -1.0 | -16.1 | 4.8 | 4.9 | -2.2 pts | |
| Net margin | 5.4 | 9.0 | 10.3 | -0.8 | -20.4 | -6.7 | -7.4 | -2.9 | -17.8 | 2.5 | 2.6 | -2.9 pts | |
| FCF margin | 8.4 | 12.3 | 13.4 | -5.6 | -33.9 | -7.1 | 3.4 | 5.7 | -21.5 | -2.1 | -0.2 | -10.5 pts | |
| ROIC | – | – | – | -16.9 | -48.1 | -7.9 | -10.9 | -3.0 | -33.6 | 10.5 | 10.7 | – | |
| R&D % of revenue | 4.9 | 3.4 | 3.2 | 4.2 | 4.3 | 3.6 | 4.3 | 4.3 | 5.7 | 4.0 | 3.9 | -0.9 pts | |
| Stock pay % of revenue | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.5 | +0.3 pts | |
| Capex % of revenue | 2.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 2.0 | 3.4 | 3.3 | 4.1 | +0.5 pts | |
Change uses 2016 and 2025 only: compound annual growth for amounts, points for margins and returns, and the change in amount for net cash. A dash means no 2016 base. Trend shows the fiscal years.
Moat
Moat scorecard
- Strength
- Confidence
- Structure
- Duopoly
- Durability
- durable
- Trajectory
- narrowing
- Pricing power
- weak
- Commercial Airplanes (BCA)44.8%2 claims
- Defense, Space & Security (BDS)32.3%2 claims
- Global Services (BGS)22.9%2 claims
Moat claims
- Applies to
- Commercial Airplanes (BCA)
- Confidence
- Durability
- durable
- Trajectory
- narrowingas of Oct 3, 2026
Designing, certifying and producing large jets requires engineering experience, major factories and a qualified supplier base built over decades. This limits entry. It does not give Boeing exclusive regulatory rights, and Airbus has comparable capabilities. Boeing's production problems have weakened its ability to turn this barrier into profit.
Deliveries and FAA permissions improved, but factory economics remain weak. Deferred production costs rose through June, and the CEO said in September that 737 output was still unstable at 47 per month. The entry barrier survives while Boeing's cost advantage remains impaired.
- Commercial airplane deliveries171+14%
- 737 program deliveries129+24%
- 787 program deliveries25+4%
- Commercial Airplanes operating profit−$322M+42%
- Commercial Airplanes backlog$596.7B+14%
- 737 deferred production costs$13.1B+19%
- 787 deferred production costs$14.4B+8%
- 777X deferred production costs$1.7B+55%
- Quality failures can stop deliveries and increase the cost of a large factory base.
- Suppliers and skilled labor can constrain output even when orders are strong.
- COMAC can build experience with state support; Airbus already competes at full scale.
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- FilingBoeing June 2026 Form 10-Q: segment results, program costs and backlogJul 28, 2026
- SourceFAA restores Boeing authority to issue airplane airworthiness certificatesJul 17, 2026
- SourceFAA certification of Boeing 737 MAX 7Aug 3, 2026
- Applies to
- Commercial Airplanes (BCA)
- Confidence
- Durability
- medium
- Trajectory
- stableas of Oct 3, 2026
An airline that stays within an aircraft family can reuse trained crews, spares, maintenance procedures and ground equipment. This favors repeat orders and makes a fleet change costly. The benefit is strongest within a family; it is not an obligation to buy Boeing.
Family operating savings remain in place, and MAX 7 certification expands the family offer. Availability and aircraft economics still let customers switch; there is no verified increase in repeat-order retention.
- Commercial airplane deliveries171+14%
- 737 program deliveries129+24%
- 787 program deliveries25+4%
- Commercial Airplanes operating profit−$322M+42%
- Commercial Airplanes backlog$596.7B+14%
- Delivery delays can force airlines to select available Airbus aircraft.
- Airline mergers, fleet replacement and leasing can reduce the cost of changing families.
- A materially better aircraft can outweigh training and spare-parts costs.
- SourceBoeing 777 design highlights: fleet commonality (accessed October 3, 2026)Oct 3, 2026
- SourceFAA certification of Boeing 737 MAX 7Aug 3, 2026
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- Applies to
- Defense, Space & Security (BDS)
- Confidence
- Durability
- medium
- Trajectory
- stableas of Oct 3, 2026
Security requirements, prior program experience and systems-integration capability limit the pool of credible defense bidders. The F-47 award shows that Boeing can still win major programs. Relationships support access to competitions; they do not guarantee awards or profit.
Major awards and a larger backlog support Boeing's place among the primes. Recurring losses show that access to procurement has not yet produced reliable returns.
- Defense, Space & Security operating profit−$15M-114%
- Defense, Space & Security backlog$85.3B+15%
- Poor performance can damage eligibility and later contract awards.
- Budgets, export approvals and program priorities can change.
- New suppliers and open-system designs can reduce incumbent control.
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- SourceUS Air Force awards Boeing the F-47 development contractMar 23, 2025
- FilingBoeing June 2026 Form 10-Q: segment results, program costs and backlogJul 28, 2026
- Applies to
- Defense, Space & Security (BDS)
- Confidence
- Durability
- medium
- Trajectory
- narrowingas of Oct 3, 2026
Multi-year aircraft and space contracts give Boeing a place on programs that are hard to transfer during development and production. That creates visibility, but fixed-price terms can leave Boeing paying for cost overruns. A large contract can protect revenue while destroying profit.
Losses continue despite strong demand. The $280 million VC-25B revision pushed BDS back into an operating loss in Q2 2026, showing that long contracts still transfer substantial execution risk to Boeing.
- Defense, Space & Security operating profit−$15M-114%
- Defense, Space & Security backlog$85.3B+15%
- Fixed-price development contracts expose Boeing to labor, material and technical overruns.
- Schedule delays can trigger penalties or termination.
- Government funding may not cover every year in the backlog.
- FilingBoeing June 2026 Form 10-Q: segment results, program costs and backlogJul 28, 2026
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- Applies to
- Global Services (BGS)
- Confidence
- Durability
- durable
- Trajectory
- stableas of Oct 3, 2026
Boeing combines parts distribution, fleet engineering, training, modifications and logistics across a global support network. Customers can reduce coordination work by using an integrated provider. Many tasks remain open to independent providers and airline maintenance teams.
Services remain profitable and backlog is larger. The digital sale reduces the range of services, so growth must be judged on the remaining business rather than on the divestiture gain.
- Global Services operating profit$968M-8%
- Global Services backlog$32.8B+50%
- Airlines can insource maintenance or use competing service networks.
- Skilled technicians and parts shortages can raise the cost of support.
- The 2025 digital sale removed products that could be bundled with physical support.
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- FilingBoeing June 2026 Form 10-Q: segment results, program costs and backlogJul 28, 2026
- Applies to
- Global Services (BGS)
- Confidence
- Durability
- durable
- Trajectory
- stableas of Oct 3, 2026
Aircraft remain in service for decades and require replacement parts, training, engineering changes and technical support. Boeing's own fleet gives it product knowledge and access to recurring demand. It does not own all engine or component aftermarket revenue.
The fleet continues to create support demand and the remaining services business earns operating profit. Public data do not separate captive Boeing-platform sales from competitively won work, so stronger exclusivity is not established.
- Global Services operating profit$968M-8%
- Global Services backlog$32.8B+50%
- Aircraft retirement can reduce the serviceable installed fleet.
- Approved alternative parts, used parts and independent repair reduce exclusivity.
- Engine and component OEMs can capture the highest-value aftermarket work.
- FilingBoeing 2025 Form 10-K: business, competition, programs and contractsJan 30, 2026
- SourceBoeing 777 design highlights: fleet commonality (accessed October 3, 2026)Oct 3, 2026
- FilingBoeing June 2026 Form 10-Q: segment results, program costs and backlogJul 28, 2026
Profile change log
- Oct 3, 2026 · analyst revision
Added a direction and dated evidence for all six moat claims, plus the investment debate, management profile, customer and supplier groups, and shared end markets. The case now rests on cash generation and program economics, with services as a support business rather than a software lock-in claim.
- Oct 3, 2026 · business change
Added the MAX 7 certification and return of airworthiness-certificate authority, while retaining the September warning that 737 production was not stable. Added the October 1 SPEEA contract approval. Certification progress reduces obstacles but does not prove profitable production.
- Oct 3, 2026 · method change
Removed the 47.0%-47.5% commercial-aircraft share estimate and HHI of 5,015. Both came from a calculated Airbus-Boeing delivery comparison, rather than a reported share of the defined global market. Boeing and Airbus reported delivery counts now provide the comparison.
- Oct 3, 2026 · analyst revision
Certification requirements are now part of the aircraft engineering and scale barrier, replacing a separate regulated-pipe claim. Boeing has no exclusive regulated commercial-aircraft franchise. Commercial scale strength falls from 4 to 3, and long-contract strength from 3 to 2, because recurring losses limit returns.
Industry & peers
Peer map
Hover a point for its values; click a peer to compare. Dashed lines: industry medians.
Commercial aircraft manufacturing
Global manufacture of commercial passenger and cargo aircraft for airlines and lessors, including large jets, regional jets and turboprops. Boeing sells large jets within this wider market. Player shares below measure the broad commercial-aircraft order book in early 2026, rather than annual revenue or deliveries.
| Stocks | Moat | Gross m. | Op. m. | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BA | 61 | 4.7% | 4.9% | |
| Industry median | 19 | 80 | 20.1% | 10.7% |
| Sector median | 88 | 76 | 37.0% | 17.5% |
| All stocks median | 398 | 76 | 52.9% | 19.6% |
Moat medians cover every stock. Margin medians count only stocks with collected numbers and need at least three.
Drivers & risks
- Fleet replacement and fuel efficiency create long-term demand even when short-term traffic slows. Manufacturer forecasts support a large replacement and expansion need, but do not guarantee timely deliveries.
- The economic cycle has a strong effect through airline traffic, profits and capacity plans. Long order books buffer immediate demand changes, while acceptance and financing determine near-term cash collection.
- Interest rates have a strong effect on lessor financing and airlines' ability to fund aircraft. Lower financing costs help deliveries; higher costs can defer orders or acceptance.
- Fuel prices create two effects: expensive fuel strengthens the case for efficient jets but reduces airline cash available to buy them. The net effect depends on each operator's finances.
- Certification and production approvals have a strong direct effect on available supply. FAA MAX 7 approval in August 2026 expands Boeing's certified product range, while continued oversight makes quality central to output.
- Production scale does not ensure low costs. Engine, material and skilled-labor shortages can hold back deliveries and increase the cash tied up in aircraft inventory.
- A stronger dollar has a moderate to strong effect on non-US customers because aircraft and financing are commonly priced in dollars. Currency hedges and local revenues only partly buffer the burden.
- Tariffs, export restrictions and trade disputes can raise parts costs or block delivery to customers. They can also strengthen state-backed local competitors.
- Safety failures, grounding or certification delays can stop revenue and weaken airline trust. Regulatory permission alone does not prove reliable production.
- Geopolitical disruption can reduce travel and airline cash. Competition for scarce delivery slots helps order books, but a long delay also gives customers reasons to cancel or change aircraft families.
Bulls & bears
Can Boeing turn its commercial-aircraft recovery and defense backlog into sustained cash generation, without repeated program losses consuming the services profit?
Arguments
What to watch
- 1Commercial deliveries, stable 737 and 787 output and FAA findings
- 2BCA and BDS quarterly operating profit
- 3737, 787 and 777X deferred production costs
- 4New fixed-price program losses and certification schedules
- 5Operating cash flow, capex and total debt
- 6BGS profit and backlog after the digital sale
Next check: October 27, 2026: confirmed Q3 results. Check whether more deliveries improve cash flow and program profit, whether deferred costs stop rising, and whether 737-10 certification and the 2027 777-9 plan remain on schedule.
Sources: company filings and dated sources collected for Find My Moat; market cap as of Oct 2, 2026. Not investment advice.
Free to reuse, commercially too, with a credit link. See the data license.
Moat Score 61/100 by <a href="https://www.findmymoat.com/stocks/XNYS:BA">Find My Moat</a> (as of September 2026)Request update
Spot something outdated? Send a quick note and source so we can refresh this profile.
Curation & Accuracy
This directory blends AI‑assisted discovery with human curation. Entries are reviewed, edited, and organized with the goal of expanding coverage and sharpening quality over time. Your feedback helps steer improvements (because no single human can capture everything all at once).
Details change. Pricing, features, and availability may be incomplete or out of date. Treat listings as a starting point and verify on the provider’s site before making decisions. If you spot an error or a gap, send a quick note and I’ll adjust.